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Legal Origins, Investor Protection, and Canada  
Poonam Puri 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Beginning with their publication of Legal Determinants of 
External Finance,1 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (“LLSV”) asked: “Why do some 
countries have so much bigger capital markets than others?”2 
According to them, the answer lies in the legal environment of the 
country—its legal origin.3 LLSV conclude that because common law 
countries have better investor protection mechanisms and better 
enforcement, bigger capital markets are more achievable.4 They also 
find that the concentration of ownership of shares in the largest 
public companies is negatively related to investor protection.5 Their 
theories have led to a number of influential papers, either in 
agreement, or as a critique to their work—collectively turning LLSV 
“into the most cited economists in the world over the past decade.”6 
While LLSV classified Canada as a common law jurisdiction in 
their studies, Canada actually stands out as somewhat unique in the 
world financial markets as one of the few countries with both 
common and civil law traditions. While the federal government and 
twelve of the thirteen provinces and territories operate under the 
common law system, Quebec operates a civil law system in its 
 
  Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University; Co-
Director, Hennick Centre for Business and Law, York University; Director of Research and 
Policy, Capital Markets Institute, Rotman School of Business. (This paper is current as of 
October 2009.) I would like to acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Anne Ramsay, 
Jody Wong, Nitika Puri, and Brandon Luft in the preparation of this Article. An earlier version 
of this paper was presented at the “Evaluating Legal Origins Theory” Symposium at the  
J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University in 2009. 
 1. Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 
(1997). 
 2. Id. at 1131. 
 3. Id. at 1149. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 1132. 
 6. Nicholas Thompson, Common Denominator, LEGAL AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2005, available 
at http://legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2005/feature_thompson_janfeb05.msp. 
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province within the larger Canadian common law framework. This 
fact makes Canada an interesting jurisdiction for exploration of the 
LLSV theories, conclusions, and critiques. 
Canada’s capital markets are also different than the United States 
or the United Kingdom. Canada is a small player in the world’s 
capital markets, with Canadian issuers representing only 3% of the 
world’s capital.7 Despite Canada being such a small player, the 
number of Canadian public companies is relatively high compared to 
other countries, with about 4000 issuers listed on the TSX and TSX 
Venture Exchange.8 Canada also has a small number of very large 
issuers and a large number of very small issuers. For example, the 
market capitalization of the 200 largest issuers listed on the TSX 
accounts for more than 88% of the total market capitalization of all 
TSX and TSX Venture Exchange listed companies.9 Over 190 of 
Canada’s largest issuers are also listed on major U.S. exchanges.10 In 
addition, a significant number of the largest non-financial public 
companies in Canada have controlling or major shareholders.11 
Studies show that valuations of Canadian companies cross listed 
in the United States are higher than those listed only in Canada.12 
Studies also show that the cost of capital in Canada is approximately 
twenty-five basis points higher than in the United States.13 These 
differences in valuation and cost of capital could be the result of 
differences in the quality of investor protection between Canada and 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. The June 2009 statistics show 1503 issuers listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(“TSX”), while 2429 issuers are listed on the TSX Venture Exchange. See TMX GROUP INC., 
MARKET STATISTICS, http://www.tmx.com/en/pdf/MarketStatistics_TMXGroup_Q22009. 
pdf. 
 9. Christopher Nicholls, The Characteristics of Canada’s Capital Markets and the 
Illustrative Case of Canada’s Legislative Regulatory Response to Sarbanes-Oxley, June 15, 2006, 
at 133, available at http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/V4%283A%29%20Nicholls.pdf. 
 10. New York Stock Exchange, Listing Directory, http://www.nyse.com/about/ 
listed/lc_all_region_1.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2009); NASDAQ, Listed Companies, 
http://www.nasdaq.com/asp/NonUsOutput.asp?page=C&previousCount=30&region=Nort
hamerica (last visited Nov. 3, 2009). 
 11. NICHOLLS, supra note 9, at 134; see also Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Poonam Puri, Dual 
Class Shares in Canada: A Historical Analysis, 29 DALHOUSIE L.J. 117, 126–32 (2006). 
 12. Michael R. King & Dan Segal, Market Segmentation and Equity Valuation: 
Comparing Canada and the United States, 18 J. INT’L. FIN. MARKETS, INST. & MONEY 245, 
246 (2008). 
 13. Paul Halpren & Poonam Puri, ‘Canada Steps Up’—Task Force to Modernize 
Securities Legislation in Canada: Recommendations and Discussion, 2 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 191, 
191 (2007). 
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the United States. It is reasonable to attribute these differences to 
investor concerns about Canada’s fragmented regulatory structure 
for securities, concerns about ineffective enforcement vis-à-vis the 
United States, and concerns about the significance of large numbers 
of controlling or major shareholders in Canada. These factors 
suggest that context is important in the relative strengths of the 
capital market and investor protection and that there is much more 
at play than can be found in examining the system of laws. 
Canada (and Quebec within Canada) provides an excellent 
context in which to explore the nuances of the LLSV theories, 
conclusions, and critiques on investor protection, capital markets, 
and legal families. Three issues are explored in this paper. The first 
issue is how and why Canada fared relatively well (in contrast to the 
United States in particular) in the recent financial crisis. The second 
issue is why Canada still has not created a national regulator for 
securities, despite more than forty years of attempts to do so. The 
third issue explored in this paper is how Quebec, as a civil law 
jurisdiction, operates within an overarching Canadian common law 
framework and the cross-fertilization implications of a civil law 
system within a common law jurisdiction. 
I explore these three issues by examining the development of 
various investor protection laws and structures over time in Canada 
(as opposed to a point in time as the LLSV studies do), and also by 
providing context which helps to explain why certain rules and 
structures have been adapted and others, while economically 
efficient, may have been rejected. This exploration of Canada 
highlights that context matters when looking at the laws related to 
investor protection within a country. Not all investor protection 
mechanisms are located in the corporate statutes, as LLSV assumes. 
LLSV did not explore securities law rules, securities law structures, or 
banking laws. In Canada, as in many other jurisdictions, securities 
laws and securities structure have an impact on investor protection 
and the debate on a common securities regulator has focused on 
improving investor protection and improving enforcement. 
Furthermore, banking laws and the banking framework play an 
important role in investor protection, in the broader sense. In 
Canada, investor protection is reflected in the conservative nature of 
its banking system which allowed Canadian financial institutions to 
escape relatively unscathed from the recent financial crisis. Finally, 
the Canadian system is both structured in such a way and has 
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evolved in such a way that investor protections are fairly consistent 
between the common law and civil law provinces, even when the civil 
law statute does not necessarily mimic the common law statute. The 
unifying role of the Supreme Court of Canada and the unifying 
effect of various bodies such as the Canadian Securities 
Administrators for provincial securities laws that work to ensure that 
the laws and regulations are consistent across the country. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II explores the details of the 
LLSV studies. Part III highlights critiques of the LLSV studies and 
their conclusions. Part IV explores the case of Canada in relation to 
investor protection and capital markets. It first explores how Canada 
faired during the recent financial crisis. It then explores the debate 
over a national securities commission. Finally, it considers the 
position of Quebec, as the only civil law province, within Canada, 
and how investor protections have remained relatively harmonized 
between legal families. Part V concludes. 
II. WHAT DO LLSV SAY? 
This Part of the paper summarizes the findings and contentions 
of LLSV noted at the beginning of this Article.14 In their well-known 
1998 paper Law and Finance,15 LLSV looked at laws pertaining to 
investor protection. Their goal was to “establish whether laws 
pertaining to investor protection differ across countries and whether 
these differences have consequences for corporate finance.”16 In 
order to reach their goal, they distinguished between common 
families of law within civil law (French, German, and Scandinavian), 
and those within common law (British colonies, United States, 
Canada, Australia, and India), using a sample of forty-nine 
countries.17 While they acknowledge that legal scholars often 
disagree upon the definition of a “legal family,” they based their 
research on the approach used by scholars that enabled the 
identification of civil law and common law traditions.18 Furthermore, 
to classify countries into legal families, LLSV relied on the works of 
 
 14. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
 15. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) 
[hereinafter La Porta et al., Law & Finance]. 
 16. Id. at 1121. 
 17. Id. at 1115–16. 
 18. Id. at 1117–19. 
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Reynolds and Flores.19 
The measurement of investor protection was done by looking at 
shareholder rights, anti-director rights, and creditor protection 
rights.20 Some of the criteria they used for coding shareholder and 
anti-director rights were: one share - one vote, proxy by mail 
allowed, shares not blocked before meeting, cumulative voting, 
oppressed minority, pre-emptive right to new issues, and percentage 
of share capital to call extraordinary shareholder meeting.21 In terms 
of creditor protection rights, LLSV scored countries in both 
reorganization and liquidation. 22 
Based on a regression analysis, they concluded that common law 
countries tend to afford more protection to their investors than do 
civil law countries, while French civil law countries offer the weakest 
protection.23 They also noted that the ranking is roughly the same 
for both shareholder protection and creditor protection, meaning 
“[i]t is not the case that some legal families protect shareholders and 
others protect creditors.”24  
With these findings in mind, LLSV further posed the question of 
whether countries with poor investor protection compensate in other 
ways, such as having quality law enforcement.25 To evaluate the 
quality of law enforcement, LLSV used five criteria: efficiency of 
judicial system, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation, and 
likelihood of contract repudiation by the government.26 From their 
data, LLSV answer their question in the negative.27 They ultimately 
conclude that law enforcement is stronger in common law countries, 
and weakest in the French civil law countries.28 But while quality of 
law enforcement does not compensate for the quality of laws, 
countries tend to develop substitute mechanisms, like ownership 
concentration, for poor investment protection.29 
 
 19. Id. at 1119 (citing THOMAS REYNOLDS & ARTURO FLORES, FOREIGN LAW: 
CURRENT SOURCES OF BASIC LEGISLATION IN JURISDICTIONS OF THE WORLD (1989)). 
 20. Id. at 1127–28, 1134. 
 21. Id. at 1122–25 (listing the variables used in the study). 
 22. Id. at 1134. 
 23. Id. at 1129. 
 24. Id. at 1139. 
 25. Id. at 1139–40. 
 26. Id. at 1140. 
 27. Id. at 1141. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 1141, 1145. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2010 7:55 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1676 
However, do countries with poor investor protection actually 
suffer? While LLSV had no definitive answer to this question, they 
do suggest a positive association between the legal system and 
economic development.30 In subsequent research, LLSV attempted 
to expand on their findings. In 1999, they set out to study the effect 
of protections on valuation and found that countries with better 
shareholder protection are associated with a higher valuation of 
corporate assets.31 
The Legal Origins Theory debate continues and has led to a 
surge of publications on this subject matter. While LLSV have paved 
the way with their arguments and findings, they have garnered a lot 
of support and criticism at the same time. But ultimately, the 
discussions and debates will further our understanding of the 
differences in investor protection and market outcomes around the 
world. 
III. CRITIQUES OF LLSV 
The LLSV legal origins theory has been critiqued in several ways 
including: A. methodology, B. coding and variables, C. context, and 
D. other explanations. 
A. Methodology 
The methodology that LLSV employ in their studies is one of 
the more obvious criticisms. The problem with using regression 
analysis as a main tool is simply the fact that correlation does not 
equal causation, and that correlation can be misleading. For example, 
while no law in the United States or United Kingdom requires 
boards of directors to be independent of management, correlation 
makes it seem like legal rules “caused” this independence because it 
is the norm in both these countries.32 Law in general is hard to 
quantify, and, thus, some speculate on the usefulness of such 
quantitative studies.33 In his 2005 paper, Siems reviewed the use of 
 
 30. Id. at 1153. 
 31. Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147, 
1166–69 (2002). 
 32. John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Examination of the Private 
Benefits of Control 6–7 (Colum. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 183, 2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=257613. 
 33. Mathias M. Siems, Numerical Comparative Law: Do We Need Statistical Evidence in 
Law in Order to Reduce Complexity?, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 521 (2005). 
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numerical comparisons of laws and found both arguments for and 
against the use of numerical comparisons. The critiques include the 
argument that numerical comparisons oversimplify the complex legal 
systems that exist where historical context and institutional 
dimensions play an important role,34 as discussed further below. 
Furthermore, law is extraordinary by the dynamic nature of the law-
and-society systems, including extra-jurisdictional complexities, 
which need to be considered when studying the impact of laws.35 
Laws are prescriptive and reactive and are more about values then 
they are quantifiable.36 Finally, the focus of legal rules, especially in 
the context of comparative law, should be on the functionality of 
laws rather than the legal similarities and differences.37 LLSV’s focus 
on whether a rule exists or does not exist in various countries ignores 
the possibility of other legal solutions which achieve the same result, 
but in a different manner.38 The legal context of laws within the 
social fabric of a country is a critical element of comparative law that 
cannot be established by applying simplifying numerical comparisons 
of law between countries, although it may apply to a comparison of 
laws within the same country.39 
While there is criticism of the use of numerical comparisons in 
legal research, the LLSV theories could be seen as a way to reduce 
the complicated endeavour of comparative law into something that is 
more understandable and therefore useable.40 There are also 
arguments that law is no more extraordinary than any other social 
science, such as economics or political science, and yet these sciences 
are able to use statistics to analyze data to some degree of success.41 
Finally, since the study of comparative law is relatively new, especially 
in terms of methodology, there are no set rules on how to conduct 
these types of studies.42 
In addition, it is argued that the categorization of law seems 
arbitrary and the distinction between common and civil law is not 
 
 34. Id. at 529. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 530. 
 37. Id. at 531. 
 38. Id. at 532. 
 39. Id. at 531, 533. 
 40. Id. at 534. 
 41. Id. at 535. 
 42. Id. at 537. 
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useful in terms of a law-and-finance analysis.43 As a result, some have 
suggested a more precise criteria consisting of four identifiers: 
European colonization (colonizing power), language, relative 
importance of statutory law and courts, and formality/flexibility of a 
legal system.44 Clear criteria are necessary in order to categorize law, 
otherwise it may result in measurement errors and biased 
coefficients.45 
B. LLSV Coding and Variables 
Besides concerns with methodological tools, the LLSV coding 
may also be questionable.46 One specific example is that it may be 
misleading to code the components of investor protection in a binary 
manner as being satisfactory or not satisfactory since it is often in the 
middle.47 Spamann has argued that there is inconsistent treatment in 
the coding, and when he corrected the values of the “Antidirector 
Rights Index,” he obtained data showing that the findings of LLSV 
did not hold—there was no difference between common and civil 
law jurisdictions.48 
Apart from this coding inconsistency, other variables are 
inconsistently coded or used as well.49 For example, whereas a 
“mandatory dividend” variable appears on the LLSV 1998 study,50 it 
is left out in the LLSV 2000 study.51 LLSV 1998 also did not 
differentiate between default and mandatory legal rules.52 
Furthermore, many of the shareholder protection variables have not 
been theoretically or empirically determined, the number of variables 
 
 43. See Mathias M. Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative 
Law, 52 MCGILL L.J. 55 (2007). 
 44. Id. at 70–73. 
 45. Id. at 70. 
 46. See Stefan Voigt, Are International Merchants Stupid? Their Choice of Law Sheds 
Doubt on the Legal Origin Theory, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2008). 
 47. Caspar Rose, The Challenges of Quantifying Investor Protection in a Comparative 
Context, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 369, 384–85 (2007). 
 48. Holger Spamann, ‘Law and Finance’ Revisited 16–17 (Harvard Law School John 
M. Olin Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 12, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1095526. 
 49. Id. at 7. 
 50. La Porta et al., supra note 15, at 1123. 
 51. La Porta et al., supra note 31, at 1156–57. 
 52. Rose, supra note 47, at 391. To their credit, this aspect was later incorporated by 
expanding the variable descriptions. Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-
Dealing (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 11883, 2005). 
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used to measure the legal frameworks is insufficient, and there may 
be bias in the variables chosen because they are derived from 
common law.53 
In reconsidering LLSV’s shareholder protection measures for 
Austria and the United Kingdom, Schmidbauer compiled his own 
shareholder protection score for the index, and concluded that law is 
not the main link—it only plays an assisting role.54 Perhaps one of the 
more important limitations is that the indices that LLSV create only 
provide us with a cross-sectional view of the law at a point in time.55 
When legal rules are coded as they have evolved over time, including 
norms derived from takeover codes and corporate governance 
codes,56 the differences between civil and common law jurisdictions 
converge over time.57 Further, while using this new index,58 there 
was no link between shareholder protection and stock market 
development. This suggests that perhaps strength of shareholder 
protection may not matter for financial development.59 
C. Context 
The critiques related to methodology lead into a discussion of 
context. LLSV have been criticized for focusing largely on legal 
families and very little on the way by which the law has developed 
within the specific country.60 The context in which laws are 
developed is important. The history of a country matters when 
looking at how laws are developed, as it may help to explain why 
there are similarities and differences between jurisdictions. In 
addition, the political economy and the social and cultural 
circumstances of a country are important to demonstrate that 
 
 53. Robert Schmidbauer, On the Fallacy of LLSV Revisited—Further Evidence About 
Shareholder Protection in Austria and the United Kingdom 10 (Feb. 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913968. 
 54. Id. at 44. 
 55. John Armour et al., Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An 
Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis 11 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper 
No. 108, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1094355. 
 56. Id. at 12. 
 57. See id. at 37–39. 
 58. Id. at 32–35. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic 
Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect 16 (William Davidson, Working Paper No. 
410, 2001), available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/39794. 
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although the laws may be different, the effect may be similar in terms 
of investor protection. This may be especially true when countries 
are at different stages of development, as the law then must deal with 
different social problems, not just investor protection.61 
In a similar manner, Pistor proposed that the process in which 
legal change occurs is crucial for the development of effective law.62 
She argues that “for law to be effective, it must become part of the 
institutional fabric of a society, contributing to the process of 
institutional innovation and change.”63 Formalizing laws on the 
books is not sufficient; rather, it is “[o]nly when the law is used—
when it is modified in response to changing demands or 
socioeconomic conditions”—that the law truly becomes 
operationalized.64 In essence, the “success of a legal system is not 
determined by having miraculously enacted good law at the outset 
but by developing the capacity to continuously find solutions to new 
problems.”65 
There is also debate as to whether laws can be successfully 
transplanted to other jurisdictions, given the specific context in 
which the laws were first developed. Armour et al. suggested that 
laws derived from corporate governance standards considered to be 
international best practice do not work well when transplanted into 
contexts removed from those of the systems in which they 
originated.66 It was suggested that while investor protections relating 
to independent board members and the mandatory bid rule, which 
both originated in the common law, “may be well-fitted to a 
dispersed ownership regime, they may work less well in systems with 
concentrated ownership.”67 The view was that “[i]ndependent 
directors do little to . . . [improve] majority-minority agency costs 
where they are appointed by the majority shareholder; similarly, the 
mandatory bid rule can, in this context, make it more difficult for 
acquirers to purchase a company, by forcing the bidder to share the 
 
 61. Siems, supra note 33, at 532. 
 62. Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West, Evolution 
of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six Countries, WORLD BANK RES. 
OBSERVER, Spring 2003, at 89–90. 
 63. Id. at 90. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Armour et al., supra note 55, at 40. 
 67. Id. 
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control premium with minority shareholders.”68 
D. Other Explanations 
The last category of critiques in regards to LLSV’s studies 
concerns the view that legal origins cannot be the only explanation 
for investor protection in capital market development. It is possible 
that norms also play a factor in this equation.69 Legal rules are rooted 
in an environment where norms and conventional practices play an 
important role in the development, implementation, and 
enforcement of laws.70 The common law versus civil law argument 
advanced by some commentators oversimplifies this complex 
development.71 Instead, perhaps non-legally enforceable social 
norms, social cohesion, and signals72 can show that norms do matter. 
In fact, they matter the most as a practical substitution for law when 
law is the weakest.73 For example, signals about a corporation’s 
intentions become extremely important when the law and norms 
about shareholder rights are weak.74 
Another interesting perspective in the legal origins debate is 
through the lens of international transactions. In such transactions, 
businesspeople have a choice as to where they want to conduct the 
transaction: under common law or civil law.75 Voigt’s study revealed 
that in structuring their transactions, businesspeople chose American 
law less frequently than expected, while choosing French and Swiss 
law more frequently than expected.76 This seems contrary to LLSV’s 
contentions because according to them, if common law more 
effectively protected transactions, it should have been more 
frequently chosen by businesspeople.77 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Coffee, supra note 32. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 11–12. 
 72. Id. at 24. 
 73. Id. at 29. 
 74. Id. at 29–30. 
 75. Voigt, supra note 46. 
 76. Id. at 16. 
 77. Id. at 17. 
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IV. INVESTOR PROTECTION AND THE CANADIAN CAPITAL 
MARKETS 
A. Canada’s Banking System and the Financial Crisis 
Throughout the recent credit and financial crisis, the Canadian 
banking system has managed to maintain a level of profitability, 
liquidity, and financial stability not seen in other jurisdictions. The 
Canadian banking system has recently been regarded by the IMF as a 
paragon of international best practices.78 The World Economic 
Forum also recently ranked it the soundest in the world.79 While 
financial institutions around the world have collapsed or survived on 
government bailouts, Canadian banks have had access to a more 
modest mortgage purchase program. Moreover, as of early 2009, the 
banks have no longer needed it.80 Canadian banks are well 
capitalized and more conservative than banks in many other 
jurisdictions of the world.81 
How and why did Canada fare better than other jurisdictions? 
This Article offers three related explanations. First, as discussed 
below, Canada had developed more conservative banking laws than 
other jurisdictions, which no doubt played a part in the relative 
survival of its financial sector. This explanation is consistent with a 
generalized version of LLSV’s thesis that law matters (noting, 
however, that LLSV do not explore legal rules in banking when 
exploring investor protection, instead focusing only on corporate law 
rules). However, legal rules offer only a partial explanation. 
A second and contributing factor is legal structures. The 
performance of Canadian banks during the economic crisis and 
recession is due in part to the manner in which these banks are 
regulated as well as the legal rules themselves. The design of the 
regulatory bodies that oversee banking appears to play a part in 
Canada’s relative survival. This idea is evidenced by the fact that 
countries such as the United States are attempting to transplant 
Canadian structures such as the Financial Consumer Agency of 
 
 78. Pietro S. Nivola & John C. Courtney, Know Thy Neighbor: What Canada Can Tell 
Us About Financial Regulation, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Apr. 23, 2009. 
 79. Michael E. Porter & Klaus Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2008–2009, 
WORLD ECON. FORUM, 2008, at 129. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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Canada into their own regulatory framework for banking.82 LLSV 
did not consider the impact of regulatory design and structure on 
investor protection, whereas I argue in this Article that it is an 
important component.  
A third factor at play is culture and norms. A more conservative 
culture in the Canadian banking industry certainly had an impact on 
the amount and type of risk taken on by banks, allowing them to 
avoid the extent of losses of their competitors in other jurisdictions.  
1. Historical development of conservatism in the Canadian banking 
system 
The historical context of Canada’s banking system has played an 
important role in the development of the current regulatory system, 
the particular legal rules, and the relatively conservative culture of 
Canadian bank management. A historical analysis of Canada’s 
banking system reveals a trend of major banking failures that pushed 
Canada into a conservative approach towards banking, including 
heavy regulation and strict government oversight. Banking in 
Canada is centralized at the federal level, and there is no provincial 
equivalent in Canada to the U.S. state chartered banks.83 
Banking in Canada formally started when the British government 
granted a charter that created the Bank of Montreal in 1817, 
subsequently granting additional charters to other banks. The 
Constitution Act of 1867 subsequently gave the federal government 
legislative authority to deal with all issues related to “Banking, 
Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of Paper Money.”84 However, 
Canada continued to have a decentralized banking system until the 
early 1900s with the provinces being able to issue paper money. It 
was in these years that Canadians learned the vulnerabilities and 
dangers of independent, autonomous banks and the need to develop 
a system of sufficient government oversight and regulation to govern 
Canada’s banking system. 
Several large bank failures in the 1920s, including the Merchants 
Bank of Canada and the Home Bank of Canada, highlighted to the 
 
 82. House Panel Set to Start Work on Consumer-Finance Agency, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 
2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125432239442852629.html. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 
(Appendix 1985). 
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government that some sort of regulatory oversight was required to 
protect the banks’ stakeholders. In both the cases above, practically 
no warning was provided to stakeholders, depositors and investors 
that a failure was imminent.85 Not only did the collapse of major 
banks create a discussion of the government’s role in the operations 
of chartered banks, but specific provisions were being established in 
order to prevent further stakeholder destruction and ensure stability 
of Canadian banks.86 In 1933, a Royal Commission87 was established 
to study the Canadian banking system and determine whether a 
central banking institution was needed.88 The Commission 
recommended in favor of a central bank and offered specific 
suggestions that were incorporated into the Bank of Canada Act 
(“BOC Act”),89 and the Bank of Canada was created in 1935 as a 
private bank.90 In 1938 the BOC Act was amended and the Bank of 
Canada became nationalized.91 
One important aspect of the BOC Act is the deferral of standard 
setting of key bank requirements to the “Office of the 
Superintendent” (“OSFI”). OSFI currently plays a role as one of six 
regulatory oversight bodies92 that regulate aspects of the banking 
system and acts as the main banking regulator. OSFI’s mandate 
partially explains the reasons for Canada’s sound banking system. It 
states that OSFI was created to contribute to public confidence in 
the Canadian financial system by “supervising institutions and 
pension plans to determine whether they are in sound financial 
 
 85. History, BANK OF CANADA, 2009, http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/about/ 
history.html. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Proceedings of the Royal Commission on Banking and Currency, Canada, Ottawa, 
ROYAL COMMISSION ON BANKING AND CURRENCY (1933), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/9626270/Royal-Commission-on-Banking-and-Currency-1933-
CANADA-Proceedings-Vol-1-to-6-Highlights. 
 88. History, BANK OF CANADA, supra note 85. See generally M.H. OGILVIE, BANK AND 
CUSTOMER LAW IN CANADA (2007); James L. Darroch & Charles J. McMillan, Entry Barriers 
and Evolutions of Banking Systems: Lessons from the 1980s Canadian Western Bank Failures, 50 
CANADIAN PUB. ADMIN. 141, 141–66 (2007). 
 89. Bank of Canada Act, R.S.C., ch. B 2 (1985). 
 90. History, BANK OF CANADA, supra note 85. 
 91. Id. 
 92. The Department of Finance, the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Bank 
of Canada, the Financial Consumer Agency, and the Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institution set standards, coordinate the overall regulatory structure, and enforce it with 
sanctions. The Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) plays a dominant role in 
shaping mortgage default-insurance policy. 
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condition . . . and are complying with their governing law and 
supervisory requirements.”93 OSFI has traditionally and consistently 
set Canadian bank requirements higher than those set out or 
recommended by other major economic powers, including Basel II; 
the most relevant example of this is the capital adequacy guidelines 
required for Canadian banks.94 
2. Legal rules and implementation governing the Canadian banking 
system 
An important aspect of banking stability is the ability of banks to 
manage their capital during economic downturns. One area that 
OSFI regulations have protected the stability of banks in the face of 
economic downturn is the Tier 1 capital requirement95 placed on 
Canadian banking institutions. OSFI has set out a minimum 
requirement on Canadian financial institutions to carry a Tier 1 
capital ratio of 7% and an overall capital ratio of 10%.96 As a 
comparison, the 2004 Basel II Accord, which sets out international 
recommendations for banking regulations, set minimum 
requirements of 4% Tier 1 capital ratio and 8% total capital ratio.97 
The United States has a Tier 1 capital requirement of 6% and a total 
capital requirement of 10% while the United Kingdom followed the 
Basel II requirements of 4% and 8% respectively.98 After reflecting on 
the toxic assets that doomed many of the major institutions in the 
United States during the crisis and recession, it becomes even clearer 
 
 93. Our Mandate, OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
CANADA, Mar. 3, 2007, http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/osfi/index_e.aspx?DetailID=2. 
 94. Bank Act, 1991 S.C., ch. 46 (Can.). 
 95. Tier 1 capital is a measure of an institution’s ability to deal with unexpected losses. 
 96. Consultative Paper on the New Basel II Framework, OFF. OF THE SUPERINTENDENT 
OF FIN. INSTITUTIONS 40 (2004). 
 97. Guideline—Capital Adequacy Requirements, OFF. OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF 
FIN. INSTITUTIONS (2007), http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/ 
guidelines/capital/ guidelines/CAR_A1_e.pdf. Capital requirements are crucial in OSFI’s 
“Assets to Capital Multiple” test, which is placed on all financial institutions. OSFI requires 
that this ratio does not exceed twenty, meaning that an institution’s total assets can be more 
than twenty times greater than the sum of its tier 1 and tier 2 capital. Since this type of capital 
is strictly calculated, it ensures that an institution will always have an adequate degree of 
permanent capital in relation to its total assets. Therefore, even if a number of assets are written 
down or written off, the institution will still have an adequate level of “permanent capital” to 
ensure that it remains financially stable. 
 98. Canada: 2009 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Staff Statement; and Public 
Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion, INT’L MONETARY FUND (2009). 
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why strict and effective capital requirements are so important for 
financial institutions. 
Stricter legal rules in Canada for mortgage loans may have also 
had an impact. In Canada, both OSFI and the CMHC exercise 
prudential oversight and influence over mortgage underwriting. 
Mortgage lending in Canada tends to happen in the banking system 
and relies less on the securitization of loans, as is more typical in the 
United States.99 Moreover, the United States has a substantially 
larger sub-prime market at 13% of current outstanding mortgage 
credit, while Canada has less than 3%.100 
This is not to overemphasize the role of legal rules. Historically, 
in both Canada and the United States, the four separate pillars of the 
financial system—banking, trust companies, insurers, and securities 
dealers—have not been allowed to operate within one 
organization.101 Both Canada and the United States changed their 
rules in the 1980s and 1990s allowing banks to acquire investment 
dealers but with different results.102 In the 1980s, Canada allowed 
commercial banks to acquire and own investment dealers. 
Accordingly, each of the five Canadian banks acquired a major dealer 
as a subsidiary that then became subject to the regulatory framework 
governing commercial banks in Canada. Independent dealers still 
remain in Canada, but the major players have been absorbed by the 
commercial banks. By contrast, when the four pillars were 
dismantled in the United States, some of the largest investment 
dealers stayed independent—Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns to 
name two—and continued to be subject only to oversight by the 
SEC, not by the U.S. Federal Reserve as a commercial bank. As a 
result of the bailouts, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs agreed to 
become chartered as bank holding companies and are therefore 
under tighter supervision by the U.S. Federal Reserve.103 Thus, 
despite the same legal rules permitting similar industry structures, the 
 
 99. Nivola & Courtney, supra note 78. 
 100. Impacts of the U.S. Mortgage Crisis, DESJARDINS ECON. STUD. (2007), 
http://www.desjardins.com/en/a_propos/etudes_economiques/actualites/point_vue_econo
mique/pve70814.pdf. 
 101. The Canadian Financial Services Sector, DEP’T OF FIN. CANADA (2005), 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/toc/2005/fact-cfss-eng.asp. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Jon Hilsenrath, Damian Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall 
Street Model, Become Banks in Bid to Ride Out Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2008, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122202739111460721.html. 
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nature of the Canadian commercial and investment banking industry 
had a different risk profile than that in the United States. 
3. Culture of operational caution in the Canadian banking system 
A more conservative culture is also a contributing factor. While 
Canadian laws are more conservative than international standards, 
Canadian banks tend to be even more conservative than the OSFI 
regulations. While OSFI set out a minimum Tier 1 capital 
requirement of 7%, Canadian banks have been at 9.8%, several 
percentage points above the regulatory requirement.104 This is in 
contrast to the average capital ratio for United States investment 
banks, which was at 4%, and for European commercial banks, which 
was at 3.3%.105 
On the one hand, the analysis of Canadian banks and the 
financial crisis appears to support LLSV. Canada’s more conservative 
Tier 1 capital requirements and asset to capital multiple, in 
comparison to international standards (and its U.S. neighbor), has 
played an important part in Canada’s banks avoiding the extent of 
the financial crisis in the United States. 
On the other hand, this brief discussion also highlights that 
context, norms, and culture also play a critical role. Even though the 
laws set certain caps or ratios on the banks’ capital, most Canadian 
banks maintained a less risky capital ratio than required by the law, 
reasonably reflecting a more conservative nature as a product of the 
development of its banking system. This is not to say that all 
Canadian banks were or are equally conservative or that they will 
necessarily remain so. As some of Canada’s larger banks have 
expanded internationally, some have been more exposed to the 
United States credit crisis, resulting in large write-offs of bad 
mortgages or lending to high risk entities that have failed.106 In 
gaining exposure to foreign markets where the culture is not so 
conservative, one can only question to what degree their conservative 
nature will transplant to these new environments and vice versa. 
 
 104. Erik Heinrich, Why Canada’s Banks Don’t Need Help, TIME, Nov. 10, 2008, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1855317,00.html. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Duncan Mavin, CIBC's Writedown Woes Not Over, Say Analysts, FIN. POST,  
June 23, 2008, available at http://www.financialpost.com/story.html?id=608460. 
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B. Why Does Canada not yet have a National Securities Regulator? 
While the rest of the world is discussing the merits of a common 
or integrated financial regulator in the wake of the financial crisis,107 
Canada continues with its long standing debate over a single 
Canadian securities regulator. Canada has thirteen provincial and 
territorial securities regulators, each with its own securities act, fees, 
and processes. Historically, public companies that wished to raise 
money across Canada had to file with each securities regulator and 
pay the associated fees; similarly, intermediaries carrying on business 
across Canada had to register with multiple commissions across the 
country.108 
The debate over a common securities regulator has persisted over 
forty years with little success in achieving agreement on its 
creation.109 A common sentiment throughout all attempts at 
reforming Canada’s securities regulatory system has been that the 
current system, as presently operated, is inadequate to meet the 
challenges of today and tomorrow. While the system is not broken in 
the sense of regulatory oversight, it must be improved significantly in 
 
 107. See generally John C. Coffee & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the 
Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707 (2009). 
 108. There have been significant strides made to harmonize securities regulation across 
Canada. Since the 1990s, there has been harmonization of rules through the Canadian 
Securities Administrators and the creation of National Instruments, which sets out common 
regulations. In addition, there is now a passport system to streamline administrative processing 
of prospectuses and applications, and in 2009 a national registration system was created. 
 109. The calls for a national securities regulator began in earnest in 1964 when the Royal 
Commission on Banking and Finance recommended that the federal government establish a 
single federal agency that would take over the major responsibility for securities regulation 
from the provinces. Although this initiative failed, it did result in more interprovincial 
cooperation. In 1979, the federal government published Proposals for a Securities Market Law 
for Canada, which also proposed a single securities commission for Canada to regulate 
international and interprovincial issues of and trading in securities. Between 1994 and 1996, 
the federal government made several attempts to get provincial agreement on a proposal to 
create a Canadian Securities Commission. While there were periodic negotiations and an 
agreement was drafted, the federal government dropped the initiative due to opposition in 
Québec and the western provinces. In December 2003, the federally commissioned Wise 
Persons’ Committee once again proposed a single national regulator and attempted to address 
local interests, but nothing came of it. In June 2006, the Ontario-appointed Crawford Panel 
released a Blueprint for a Canadian Securities Commission where the call was once again for a 
model for a “common securities regulator” for Canada, operating under common legislation. 
The most recent attempt at building support for a national securities regulator was the January 
2009 report by the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation. The Expert Panel again 
recommended a Canadian Securities Commission and even presented a draft securities act.  
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order for Canada to remain competitive in attracting capital.110 The 
international community has also waded into the debate. The IMF 
has repeatedly indicated that Canada needs a single securities 
regulator.111 A Canadian securities regulator is currently one of the 
issues on the table for the proposed Canada-EU trade deal.112 
In this part of the paper, I argue that securities regulatory 
structure matters for investor protection. LLSV, however, do not 
take into account regulatory structure (or securities law rules for that 
matter). Rather, they focus on legal rules and, specifically, only 
corporate law rules. While corporate law is not unimportant, it is 
based on a system of self-regulation where market actors must pursue 
litigation in the courts themselves. While corporate law remains an 
important framework of protection of investors in private companies, 
securities laws are a primary source of investor protections for public 
companies in Canada and in many other jurisdictions.113 Similarly, 
while courts are important (a factor that LLSV take into account), 
securities regulators’ actions are arguably even more important in 
certain instances in ensuring investor protection.114 
I also argue in this part of the paper that context is critical in the 
debate on a national securities regulator and that political, economic, 
and historic circumstances constrain the choices and decisions that 
are possible. Most reasonable people would agree that if Canada 
were starting from scratch in designing a regulator for securities 
matters it would create a single regulator for the entire country; 
however, the provinces having occupied this space for so long and 
Quebec having a special place in Canada result in a tremendous 
obstacle to the possibility of a federal or single structure. A related 
 
 110.  Five Year Review Committee, Five Year Review Committee Final Report: Reviewing 
the Securities Act (Ontario), at 7 (2003), available at http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/ 
en/publications/2003/5yrsecuritiesreview.pdf (recommending that “the provinces, territories 
and federal government work towards the creation of a single securities regulator with 
responsibility for the capital markets across Canada”). 
 111. Canada Needs National Securities Regulator: IMF, CBC NEWS, June 19, 2007, 
http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2007/06/19/imf.html. 
 112. Lee Berthiaume, Canada-EU Trade Deal Could Require National Securities 
Regulator, EMBASSY MAG., Jan. 21, 2009, available at http://www.embassymag.ca/page/ 
view/eu-1-21-2009. 
 113. See JEFFERY MACINTOSH & CHRISTOPHER NICHOLLS, ESSENTIALS OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION (2002); Anita Anand, Securities Regulation at an Impasse: Developing Effective 
Regulation in an Ineffective Regulatory Regime, 20 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 191, 216 (2005). 
 114. POONAM PURI, ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS IN THE CANADIAN CAPITAL 
MARKETS (Dec. 2005) (commissioned by the Capital Markets Institute). 
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point is that, in the absence of a change in formal legal structures in 
Canada, there have been reasonable attempts at functional changes, 
by way of harmonizing laws and streamlining processes to create, for 
example, the Passport system.115 
One of the principle debates over a common securities regulator 
relates to the question of whose jurisdiction does securities 
regulation fall within: the federal government or the provinces? In 
Canada, the supervision of the securities industry was not explicitly 
given to either the provincial or federal levels of government within 
the Constitution Act, 1867. Over the years, as the capital markets 
have grown, the provinces and territories have begun to regulate 
securities under the “property and civil rights” clause of the 
Constitution Act, 1867,116 which has resulted in each province and 
territory having its own securities regulator.117 While there have been 
expert opinions indicating that the federal government could assert 
jurisdiction over capital markets,118 possibly pursuant to its power to 
legislate in respect of the “regulation of trade,”119 the federal 
government has always been reluctant to use this jurisdiction. To 
date, the jurisdiction of the federal government to override 
provincial securities law has never been tested in a court.120 
While the current system of multiple regulators has strengths— 
including a local presence, development of industry expertise, 
responsiveness to distinct local and regional issues, and innovation— 
there are a number of weaknesses.121 The weaknesses include 
 
 115. The Passport System was designed to simplify the regulatory approval process by 
allowing market participants to deal with a regulator in a centralized way and have the 
regulator’s decisions recognized across all Canadian jurisdictions. The Passport System replaces 
the principal regulator and mutual reliance review system for prospectuses and for certain 
exemptive relief applications. See Ward Sellers & Daniel Yelin, Canadian Securities Regulators 
Implement Next Phase of Passport System, http://www.osler.com/expertise_mergers.aspx? 
id=14604. The national registration system, which creates a new Canada-wide registration 
regime, came into effect on September 28, 2009. 
 116. Constitution Act, 1867, § 92(13) (Can.). 
 117. Andrew Kitching, Securities Regulation: Calls for a Single Regulator, at 2 (Feb. 16, 
2009) (on file with the Library of Parliament), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/ 
information/library/PRBpubs/prb0838-e.htm#jurisdiction. 
 118. The Wise Persons’ Committee commissioned three opinions as to the constitutional 
issues related to a national securities regulator, available at http://www.wise-
averties.ca/report_en.html. 
 119. Constitution Act, 1867, § 91(2) (Can). 
 120. Kitching, supra note 117, at 2 n.4. 
 121. Wise Persons Committee to Review the Structure of Securities Regulation in 
Canada, It’s Time, at 25 (2003), available at http://www.wise-averties.ca/main_en.html. 
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enforcement, or lack thereof, inefficient allocation of resources, 
coordination difficulties, inconsistent priorities within investor 
protection, and policy development. There are also costs associated 
with thirteen securities regulators, including duplication of costs, 
cost of compliance, time delays, opportunity costs, and the 
perception in the international community of a fragmented 
regulatory system. 122 
Enforcement of securities law is considered weak as compared to 
other jurisdictions, somewhat as a result of the fragmented system of 
securities regulation.123 In the Task Force to Modernize Securities 
Regulation, Bhattacharya found that the enforcement of securities 
laws reduces the cost of capital, which in turn increases liquidity in 
the capital markets, and, as measured against the United States, 
enforcement of securities laws is weak in Canada.124 
The inefficient allocation or lack of resources is another criticism 
of the current structure, as each province and territory has a 
securities commission with similar mandates.125 However, with the 
exception of Ontario, jurisdictions do not typically have sufficient 
resources to perform all the tasks of oversight, policy development, 
and enforcement.126 This leads to coordination difficulties between 
provinces and territories in terms of timing and priorities. Priorities 
among provincial or territorial securities commissions may differ, 
often on political grounds, in terms of investor protections and 
policy development. 
Issuers and intermediaries also criticize the costs associated with 
complying with the requirements of thirteen securities regulators. 
While public companies pay fees to each jurisdiction, fees are in some 
cases paid to the provincial government, not directly to the securities 
commission for their use. The costs of complying with thirteen 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Poonam Puri, Will Canada Step Up? Improving Enforcement in the Canadian 
Capital Markets, CAN. INVESTMENT REV., Spring 2007, at 53; see also John C. Coffee, Law 
and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, (2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm? per_id=80028#show 967482; Mary 
Condon, Rethinking Enforcement and Litigation in Ontario Securities Regulation, 32 QUEENS 
L.J. 1 (2006); Halpren & Puri, supra note 13. 
 124. Utpal Bhattacharya, Enforcement and Its Impact on Cost of Equity and Liquidity of 
the Market, 4 Canada Steps Up (Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, 
May 24, 2006). 
 125. See generally The Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, 
available at http://www.tfmsl.ca. 
 126. See PURI, supra note 114. 
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different securities acts or legislation, while significantly harmonized, 
are nonetheless imposed on public companies. 
On the international front, Canada is not represented at the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions, but, rather, 
two of Canada’s largest provinces, Ontario and Quebec, sit as 
members.127 The inability for Canada to have a single, consistent 
voice on the international stage has the potential to create problems 
in terms of implementing effective change to Canada’s capital 
markets. 
Despite the numerous studies, commissions, and panels that have 
been organized, the lack of political will of the federal government to 
move to a national regulator exists for several reasons. First, while 
not necessarily efficient or cost effective, the thirteen provincial and 
territorial securities commissions have taken a number of steps to 
harmonize their regulations and streamline their processes, which 
some will argue gets Canada functionally to the same point without a 
constitutional challenge.128 Secondly, similar to other issues that have 
a constitutional jurisdictional element to them, the proposals for a 
national securities regulator have not historically garnered much 
support from the provinces, with the exception of Ontario.129 
Quebec and Alberta have constantly expressed their disagreement 
with this strategy and have recently indicated that they will bring a 
court challenge to prevent national securities regulation.130 British 
Columbia has previously been opposed to a national regulator, its 
position has recently shifted.131 Third, the political will to create a 
national securities regulator has historically not been strong. The 
recent financial crisis and a number of high profile fraud cases are 
 
 127. International Organization of Securities Commissions, available at 
http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_members.cfm. 
 128. Council of Ministers Communiqué, Council of Ministers Continues to Implement 
Passport System (Oct. 22, 2008), available at http://www.securitiescanada.org/2008_ 
1022_communique_english.pdf. 
 129. Canada Doesn't Need National Securities Regulator: Stelmach, CBC NEWS, Jan. 14, 
2009, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/edmonton/story/2009/01/14/edm-stelmach-regulator. 
html. 
 130. Chantal Hébert, Tories See Opportunity in Regulator Feud, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 14, 
2009, available at http://www.thestar.com/News/Canada/article/570624; see also Francois 
Shalom, Quebec to Contest Single Regulator Plan, MONTREAL GAZETTE, July 9, 2009, at B1. 
 131. At the time of writing (November 2009), the Government of Canada announced 
that it intends to seek the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada on the constitutionality of 
proposed Canadian securities legislation. Press release available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/ 
eng/news-nouv/nr-cp/2009/doc_32437.html. 
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some of the major events that have spurred the federal government 
to move forward with a solid proposal for a national securities 
regulator. 
The federal government recently announced a Transition Team 
and gave it a budget of $150 million to negotiate with the provinces 
to establish a common securities regulator, based on the report and 
recommendations of the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation.132 
Needless to say, political, economic and cultural influences have 
played a role in the development of securities structure, and 
functional forms will have an impact on the negotiations and the 
model that is ultimately adopted. The Transition Team is currently 
working on draft legislation and expects that a national securities 
regulator will be running by 2012.133 
The case of Canada highlights why regulatory structure matters 
when it comes to investor protection—corporate law cannot be 
considered in isolation without considering securities law. In 
addition, context plays an important role when considering the 
impact of the regulatory structure on investor protection as the 
historical, political, and economic circumstances all play a part in 
whether an effective investor protection regime has been created. 
C. Quebec - A Civil Law Province within a Common Law Country 
Canada is somewhat unique in that both common law and civil 
law operate within the same country. The federal government and 
the provinces, other than Quebec, follow the common law. Mixed 
legal systems are also found in Louisiana, Scotland, St. Lucia, Puerto 
Rico, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, 
Namibia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka.134 Civil law, which is based 
on a written “civil code,” covers only matters of private law 
including the legal attributes of a person; the relationship between 
individuals and property; and the legal institutions governing or 
 
 132. The Canadian Securities Transition Office was established in July 2009 to assist in 
establishing a Canadian securities regulator. See generally, available at http://www.csto.ca. 
 133. Canada Aims for National Securities Regulator by 2012, VANCOUVER SUN, Sept. 
25, 2009, available at http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/business/story.html? 
id=c2314556-2883-4d98-b4bf-2af8032273d0&k=81939. 
 134. William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law vs. Civil Law (Codified and 
Uncodified) (Part I), 4 UNIF. L. REV. 591, 592–93 (1999); William Tetley, Mixed 
Jurisdictions: Common Law vs. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified) (Part II), 4 UNIF. L. REV. 
877 (1999). 
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administering these relationships. Civil codes are intended to be easy 
to understand and apply to facts through the specific nature of each 
regulation. It does not rely on precedent (or principles) to the same 
extent as common law.135 
LLSV suggest that civil law jurisdictions provide investors weaker 
legal protection than common law jurisdictions.136 LLSV also suggest 
that common law countries give shareholders and creditors the 
strongest protection while French civil law countries provide the 
weakest protection.137 But they did not address the situation where a 
country has both common law and civil law systems. The LLSV 
1998 study categorized Canada as a common law country, with the 
result that Canada was considered average for shareholder 
protection138 among common law countries, low for creditor 
protection,139 and high for enforcement of the laws.140 This part of 
the paper compares shareholder remedies and rights in the Quebec 
provincial corporate law statute with the Federal Business 
Corporations Act and finds that several important statutory remedies 
that are found in the federal corporate law statute are absent—by 
historical choice—from the Quebec statute. Nonetheless, Quebec 
courts have developed judicial versions of the derivative action and 
oppression action. 
In Canada, the Constitution Act, 1867, gives the federal and 
provincial governments similar legislative authority over business 
incorporation. Each government, federal and provincial/territorial, 
has its own incorporation statutes. During the 1970s, the corporate 
legislative framework in Canada underwent significant reform 
inspired by the recommendations published in the Dickerson 
Report.141 The purposes of this reform were threefold.  
 
 135. See JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY & RODERICK A. MACDONALD, QUÉBEC CIVIL LAW: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO QUÉBEC PRIVATE LAW (1993); Canadian Bar Association—Ontario et al., 
The New Civil Code: A Practical Guide to What Every Ontario Lawyer Needs to Know About 
Québec Law (1994); Pearl Eliadis, The Legal System in Quebec, in GERALD GALL, THE 
CANADIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 263–84 (5th ed. 2004). 
 136. Rafael La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 15, at 1116. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1130. 
 139. Id. at 1136. 
 140. Id. at 1142. 
 141. Margaret Smith, Canada Business Corporations Act: Directors’ Residency 
Requirements and Other Residency Issues, at 2, available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/ 
information/library/PRBpubs/prb9931-e.pdf.  
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2010 7:55 PM 
1671 Legal Origins, Investor Protection, and Canada 
 1695 
First, it attempted to offer a more pragmatic approach in regard to 
the mechanics, operations, and incorporation of companies. Second, 
it introduced a contractual approach with respect to how relations 
between internal actors of the corporation were to be governed. 
Finally, it offered a protective dimension to the interests and rights 
of shareholders.  
These aspects of the reform initiative were adopted in the 
Canada Business Corporations Act142 (“CBCA”) that was enacted in 
1975. Following the federal initiative, provinces responded by either 
enacting amendments to their respective corporate legislation or by 
opting to proceed with a reform inspired by the federal model. 
Quebec opted for the former by integrating Part IA to the Quebec 
Companies Act (“QCA”).143 However, the Quebec legislature did 
not strictly follow the Dickerson recommendations but rather chose 
to refrain from adopting a shareholder protection regime similar to 
the one found under the federal regulation. As a result, the QCA 
contains certain provisions designed to protect shareholders but falls 
short of offering similar remedies found in its federal counterpart, 
the CBCA. Consequently, litigants in Quebec have to refer to 
judicially created recourses found under the Civil Code of Quebec144 
(“CCQ”) and the Code of Civil Procedure145 (“CCPC”) in order to 
fill the gap. However, the judicially created recourses lack the 
flexibility and clarity usually associated with those found under the 
CBCA. 
In considering investor protection within Canada, it is necessary 
to consider the distinctions between the CBCA and the QCA 
statutes. Specific areas of corporate law that are of interest when 
comparing the QCA and the CBCA are shareholder protection and 
remedies. 
While the QCA has specific preventive measures relating to 
shareholder protection, it contains no explicit provision giving rise to 
a derivative action, an oppression remedy, or a recourse seeking a 
restraining and compliance order. In addition, the QCA does not 
offer the possibility for shareholders to exercise their right to dissent 
in the event a significant change similar to the ones listed in section 
190(1) CBCA occurs. Nonetheless, the Quebec law still provides 
 
 142. See generally Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. C 44 (1985). 
 143. Companies Act, R.S.Q., ch. C 38. 
 144. Civil Code of Quebec, 1991 S.Q., ch. 64 (Can.). 
 145. Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., ch. C 25. 
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certain powers of control and supervision to the courts in order to 
attempt to remedy this gap.  
Unlike the specific statutory provisions of the CBCA, the 
Quebec Superior Court has established the conditions under which a 
shareholder may bring an action in the name of the corporation.146 
In doing so, the Quebec court has stressed the importance of 
limiting its superintending role to situations where there is manifest 
fraudulent conduct committed by the individual(s) concerned. In 
other words, it may be more difficult to proceed with such a claim 
under the civil law regime since the standing to begin a derivative 
action is limited to shareholders and there must be a fraudulent 
element for it to proceed. Under the CBCA, a derivative action does 
not require the presence of a fraudulent element. Rather, the action 
must be taken in the best interests of the corporation. Further, 
standing is not limited to shareholders under the CBCA. 
Under federal legislation, the oppression remedy is regarded as 
being a very powerful tool in providing shareholder protection. To 
this day, the Quebec legislature has not followed suit with its federal 
counterpart and as a result, litigants are left with section 33 CCPC as 
a means of trying to bring such an action in Quebec courts. Over the 
last couple of years, the Quebec Superior Court has been more 
receptive to the idea of extending its superintending and governing 
power to offer an action similar to the oppression remedy used in 
common law provinces. Even though the court’s power has only 
been used in relation to cases dealing with fraud, some judges have 
been openly considering the idea of broadening the scope of its 
superintending and governing power to cases involving abuses of 
rights or violation of the legitimate expectations of shareholders, in a 
manner similar to the federal oppression remedy.147 
 
 146. Lagacé v. Lagacé, [1966] C.S. 489. The four conditions are: (1) the one bringing 
the action in the name of the corporation must be a shareholder; (2) the individual(s) at the 
source of the problem must have an absolute control of the corporation, in the sense they must 
control the board of directors as well as shareholder votes (holding a majority of votes); (3) the 
shareholder bringing the claim must have requested an explanation and rectification of the 
situation without receiving any positive response prior to engaging and proceeding with the 
claim; and (4) the reproachable act committed by the individual(s) at the source of the 
problem must be of a fraudulent nature towards the corporation or towards the shareholders. 
The fourth criterion is very important and illustrates that simple negligence by directors would 
not trigger the application of a derivative action. 
 147. Desautels v. Desautels, ([2005] C.S. Montreal 500-11-026015-053) (noting the 
possibility of the court appropriating powers similar to those found in the case of an 
“oppression remedy,” should the case be deserving). 
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In Canada, there are multiple corporate law statutes, with each 
province and the federal government having their own statutes. 
However, all statutes are subject to interpretation by the courts, 
ultimately the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court is a 
general court of appeal and the final authority on the interpretation 
of the entire body of law in Canada.148 The Supreme Court’s 
decisions help to unify the laws within Canada for two reasons. First, 
they have the power to interpret both common law and civil law 
legislation, and second, lower courts in all provinces must follow the 
Supreme Court’s decisions, to the extent the facts apply. 
This discussion reveals that while Quebec operates a corporate 
law framework within its civil law system that on the surface provides 
legal rules that do not offer as much protection as the federal 
corporate law statute (or other provincial law statues). The Quebec 
courts have stepped in to judicially craft remedies for shareholders. 
That being said, these QCA remedies are currently more difficult to 
access or achieve recourse under than those in the federal statutory 
regime. However, Quebec has recently proposed changes149 to the 
Quebec Companies Act to incorporate many of the practices that 
exist elsewhere in Canada, including better protection for 
shareholders, and new governance rules.150 Some of the proposed 
changes relate to protections of minority shareholders including new 
remedies in the event of abuse or inequity. Shareholders will have the 
possibility of tabling a shareholder proposal at company meetings 
and a minority shareholder who disagrees with a major change made 
to the structure or the activities of the corporation may be able to 
demand that his shares be repurchased.151 In addition, shareholders 
will have the right to ask the Court for the authorization to act in 
the name of the corporation, or derivative actions.152 Nonetheless, 
this does indicate the reflexive relationship between a civil law 
 
 148. PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 246–49 (5th ed. 2007). 
 149. At the time of writing the Quebec legislature proposed amendments to the Quebec 
Companies Act to align the legislation with other provinces and to improve certain aspects as 
compared to other jurisdictions. See Reform of the Québec Companies Act: Bill 63, Oct. 9, 
2009, http://www.dwpv.com/en/17620_24316.aspx. 
150. Press Release, Ministère des Finances Québec, Major Reform of the Companies Act (Oct. 
7, 2009) http://www.finances.gouv.qc.ca/documents/communiques/en/COMEN_2009 
1007.pdf. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Reform of the Québec Companies Act: Bill 63, Oct. 9, 2009, http://www.dwpv. 
com/en/17620_24316.aspx. 
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province and the common law operating on a national level. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps one of the most important results of the LLSV study was 
to facilitate discussion of how law impacts the growth of capital 
markets. As the three case studies in Canada illustrate, the context of 
how laws develop is a strong indicator of how and why laws within 
the capital markets have developed the way they have. It is not as 
simple as delineating between common law and civil law 
jurisdictions. Rather the political, economic, and historical 
backgrounds are some of the important contributors to the 
development of laws and legal structures. 
In this paper I explored the situation of Canada during the 
recent financial crisis, the efforts to create a national securities 
regulator, and the role of Quebec, a civil law jurisdiction, within the 
federation of common law jurisdictions. In exploring these issues it 
was clear that the development of various investor protection laws and 
structures over time in Canada (as opposed to a point in time as in 
the LLSV studies), and also by providing context which helps to 
explain why certain rules and structures have been adapted while 
others, although economically efficient, may have been rejected. This 
exploration of Canada highlights that context matters when looking 
at the laws related to investor protection within a country. Not all 
investor protection mechanisms are located in the corporate statutes, 
as LLSV assume. LLSV do not explore securities law rules, securities 
law structures, or banking laws. In Canada, as in many other 
jurisdictions, securities laws and securities structure have an impact 
on investor protection, and the debate on a common securities 
regulator has focused on improving investor protection and 
improving enforcement. Furthermore, banking laws and the banking 
framework play an important role in investor protection. In Canada, 
investor protection is reflected in the conservative nature of the 
banking system which allowed Canadian financial institutions to 
escape relatively unscathed from the recent financial crisis. Finally, 
the Canadian system is both structured and has evolved in such a 
way that investor protections are fairly consistent between the 
common law and civil law provinces, even when the civil law statute 
does not necessarily mimic the common law statute. This is the result 
of various unifying bodies such as the Canadian Securities 
Administrators, for provincial securities laws, and the unifying role of 
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the Supreme Court of Canada, for corporate law principles across the 
country. 
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